Abstract: This note proposes the segregation of independent endogenous and exogenous components of tax penalty probability to introduce a formal demonstration that enforcement and tax penalties are negatively related with income shifting.
I. Introduction
Recent studies on tax avoidance emphasize the effects of tax enforcement against income shifting in multinational enterprizes (MNEs). They argue that enforcement creates a tax cost if noncompliance exists, and countries present different levels of fiscal stringency that affects MNEs' tax planning 1 . The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) also highlights tax enforcement to restrain transfer pricing manipulation (OECD, 2013) , explaining that governments' enforcement influences the effectiveness of tax rules. In particular, the general premise is that enforcement increases the probability of imposition of fines whether MNEs manipulate transfer prices, forcing MNEs' compliance. Although current literature recognizes the relevance of tax enforcement, it typically takes the stringency effect as an assumption, and few studies effectively specify the penalty cost function in the analysis 2 .
This note uses the model of tax costs of transfer pricing manipulation to verify the premise of tax enforcement effect on income shifting. The proposed model segregates the penalty probability in two independent components: an endogenous and an exogenous component with respect to MNE. The model embodies a specification of the endogenous probability in accordance with standard conditions in literature, and applies this specification to demonstrate formally that enforcement and penalties have a negative relation with income shifting. It shows that the magnitude of tax differential shapes the optimal level of transfer pricing manipulation, but enforcing tax effectiveness reduces this magnitude.
II. The model
Consider a MNE with two divisions in different countries (i = 1,2) producing (xi) and selling (si) domestically. Division 1 exports part of its output (m) to division 2, charging a transfer price p. Using one set of books, MNE's pretax profits
with x1 = s1 + m and x2 = s2 -m. For an income tax rate ti on each country, MNE's after tax profits are Π = (1 -t1)π1 + (1 -t2)π2. If t1 ≠ t2, MNE has incentive to shift profits from high-tax to low-tax country via intrafirm trades (Yoshimine and Norrbin, 2007) Assume the harmed country i settles a penalty Ψi whether the difference between p and the arm's length price w causes profits to be shifted away from it. The probability α of imposition of Ψi depends on the extent of the difference p -w. Additionally, assume that imposition of Ψi is related with country i's tax enforcement level θi, evaluated in a standard range 0 ≤ θi ≤ 1, positively related with governments' taxation effectiveness and not influenced by MNE's decisions. For a unitary penalty φi > 0, the expected tax cost of transfer pricing manipulation is
MNE's objective function becomes ϕ = Π -Ψi (i = 2 for HighTP, and i = 1 for LowTP).
For θi > 0, transfer pricing manipulation implies Ψi > 0 3 . Thus, MNE maximizes profits when achieves equilibrium between reduced overall taxation and expected tax penalty.
III. Specification of α and optimal transfer pricing manipulation
To design a fair specification for θi is quite a complex task because the assessment of tax enforcement involve country-level institutional factors that are difficult to measure 4 .
Nonetheless, a specification for α appears to be simpler and is useful for the analysis.
Standard model assumes the expected tax penalty as a continuous function f(p -w), 3 Transfer pricing manipulation implies ϕΨ < 0. 4 Some studies create measures of tax enforcement based on rules' characteristics, e.g. Lohse et al. (2012) .
twice differentiable and satisfying f(p = w) = 0, sign fp = sign(p -w) and fpp > 0 5 .
Following Kant (1990) , assume P to be a limiting price that triggers penalty with certainty, i.e. α increases as p gets closer to P. Henceforth, α can be specified as:
where r represents curve's convexity. Logically, α infers:
-for HighTP, w < p < P implies 0 < α < 1, w ≥ p implies α = 0, and p ≥ P implies α = 1;
-for LowTP, w > p > P implies 0 < α < 1, w ≤ p implies α = 0, and p ≤ P implies α = 1.
Equation (2) has interesting characteristics. First, it is continuous and satisfies the standard conditions for all r > 1 (Proof in Appendix). Second, it implies that w is shaped by free trade forces. Tax authorities use w as a parameter, but do not have power to influence it. Third, P -w is the range of acceptable arm's length prices, so p can be hold as tax compliant within it (OECD, 2013).
Specification of α as in Equation (
2) allows the segregation of penalty probability in two independent components: α represents the endogenous component with respect to MNE, while θi represents the exogenous component. MNE can influence Ψi because variations in p cause changes in α, despite of straight impacts on income shifting. On the other hand, tax authorities are able to increase penalty probability by enforcing audit procedures and strengthening their interpretation of what is an acceptable arm's length price, although these actions cannot influence α because it cannot affect directly the comparative parameters w or P.
The equilibrium between the level of transfer pricing manipulation and the corresponding manipulation cost can be found differentiating ϕ with respect to p.
Assuming r = 2 for simplification, the first-order condition is
Clearly, the difference between p and w denotes the transfer price manipulation.
Rearranging Equation (3) leads to
The term (t2 -t1)/2φiθi reflects the influence of enforcement and unitary penalty on the tax differential, which is the income shifting motivation. Enforcement and penalties are negatively related with income shifting incentive and discourage transfer pricing manipulation, i.e. increase (decrease) in θi or φi causes a decrease (increase) in p -w.
The same relation is obtained for the more complex cases where both countries impose income taxation under residence-based principle and for partially owned affiliates 6 .
From the analysis, the following proposition arises:
Proposition: Assuming tax costs of transfer pricing manipulation as Ψi = f(θi,φi), tax enforcement θi and tax penalty φi are negatively related with income shifting.
Proof: See Appendix.
Equation (4) implies that the extent of tax differential determines the amount of MNE's price manipulation, but countries are able to toughen tax compliance actions in order to discourage this strategy. Higher enforcement levels and greater tax fines generate two effects. First, increasing θi causes probability of imposition of unitary penalty φi to increase; as a consequence, the optimal p get closer to w, and MNE is forced to reduce transfer pricing manipulation (be more tax compliant) in order to restore equilibrium; the same occurs when φi increases. This is called "spillover effect", being an increase in compliance independent of revenues generated directly from tax audits themselves (Alm, 2012) . Second, Equation (4) suggests that countries could manage both φi and θi with intentions to recover evaded tax revenues, i.e. more tax prosecutions and greater fines effectively reduce MNE net profits. This is called "deterrent effect" of higher enforcement.
Equation (4) also shows that the range of acceptable arm's length prices is positively related with transfer pricing manipulation: the extent of (P -w) 2 represents a whole spectrum of alternatives where p can be approved for tax purposes 7 , and MNE may hold defense chances against tax inspections whether p does not reach P.
IV. Conclusion
This note introduces a formal demonstration that enforcement and tax penalties are 
